From the Crows' Nest

Ken (00:09):
Welcome to From The Crows' Nest, a podcast on electromagnetic spectrum operations, or EMSO. I'm your host, Ken Miller, director of advocacy and outreach for the Association of Old Crows. Thanks for listening. In today's episode, we're going to talk about the progress of army electronic warfare. My guest today is Mr. Eric Cologne. He is the director of strategic solutions, electronic warfare, and cyber for Corvus Consulting. He brings more than 30 years of service and experience on electronic warfare to DOD, and now in the consulting realm. He is of course a long time friend of the AOC, and I'm pleased to have him with me to talk about this important topic. Eric, it's great to have you on From the Crows' Nest. Thanks for joining me.

Eric (00:49):
My pleasure. I've been looking forward to get with you for the last couple months, and I'm happy to be on with you today, so thanks. Good timing, sir.

Ken (00:56):
Yeah, we keep seeing each other at some of the AOC conferences, and we talk about this. It's been a while, but I'm glad we were able to work it out here over the summer, so thanks for being on the show. So I thought just to kick it off, obviously I want to have a conversation just about where we are from a DOD perspective, but specifically the Army, on EMS superiority. We talk a lot on the show about EMS superiority being the backbone to mission success across all war fighting domains, and of course that includes the Army, but what they're facing may require a different perspective than we obviously have with the Air Force and Navy. So I want to talk a little bit about how these threats from Russia, China, peer competitors, how is the Army thinking about them? And then how does that influence their EW plans and programs?

Eric (01:40):
So to get after that specific question, I want to just talk about my lens really fast, so we understand where Eric Colon is coming from. So after 30 years in the military, I retired this past October working as a EW professional for the last 12 years. So I started at the brigade level and made my way all the way up to combatant command, and retired at Army Cyber. So each layer looks at these things differently, so I just wanted to articulate that first. Depends on where you're at.

Eric (02:05):
And the Army, more specifically, we restarted the EW branch in about 2010 due to the counter-IED fight, and we really had no equipment. So that's the key takeaway, is where we're at with equipment, where are we at with fighting or planning for Russia, and the Ukraine-Russia thing has been eye-opening for EW, because as most of us in this business know, EW's been forgotten for many, many years, since the Cold War, and it went downhill, and then it almost disappeared in the late '80s during the Cold War because we just weren't doing it anymore.

Eric (02:39):
So to answer the perspective of where we're at now in the EMSO fight, we still are lacking capability. And as you pointed out, Congress just signed the NDAA, and luckily there's more funding going to different programs, and so I wanted to just go back a little bit to where we started, and then answer to where we're at now.

Eric (02:58):
So counter-IEDs is where EW got back in the business in the Army. Because of the issues in Iraq and Afghanistan with a lot of the IEDs that were killing and injuring a lot of U.S. service members, we didn't have any answer to that initially. And so fast forward to where we're at now, we actually have soldiers that are EW soldiers, but they came from the counter-IED fight because we had a need for operators and maintainers of the equipment that we were getting sent to us downrange rapidly. So we went from nothing to defend ourselves against IEDs, to specifically made counter-IED equipment, specifically red, Chameleons, browns, we just threw counter-IED systems downrange, and then were magically figuring out how the stuff deconflicts. So we learned a lot from 2010 until today.

Eric (03:48):
The EW soldiers were developed in 2010. That's when it became an MOS. And specifically we didn't have anybody to maintain these systems, so we borrowed the Air Force and the Navy guys to tell us how to bring these systems to use. They told us how to deconflict these systems, which is something the Army has never really done well. And then really from an EW electronic warfare support perspective, and I should call it now electromagnetic support perspective with the new lexicon, we didn't have engineer type folks that understood how this stuff works, so we really relied on the Air Force and Navy guys who had the expertise from ships and aircraft to tell us, how do we deconflict these new systems? So that's where we started from.

Eric (04:30):
And then interestingly enough, Ken, we actually taught people how to be planners before we made them operators. So we had the Air Force and Navy officers helping us out, their EW professionals helped us out, and we just created a course, a counter-IED Duke course to teach soldiers how to maintain these pieces of equipment. But we really didn't think it through initially to say, how do the Air Force and Navy guys, how do those professionals integrate electronic warfare? Because as you know, there's a lot of congestion in the spectrum anyway, even if we don't try to do it purposefully. So we created a fairly decent course in electronic warfare in 2010. We started bringing in soldiers from other MOS's. It wasn't a [inaudible 00:05:11] MOS, so it technically wasn't an MOS, even though it was. But we brought soldiers from other MOS's to become electronic warfare NCOs, warrant officers, and then it was a functional area for officers. So it wasn't really a full MOS.

Eric (05:24):
And there's a lot of argument and discussion of, is cyber the newest branch? Is EW the newest branch? Or is Special Forces the newest branch? But 12 years, we actually developed a really amazing MOS. We actually recreated the MOS for electronic warfare soldiers, and brought them from [inaudible 00:05:43] from brand new private E-1 all the way up to O-6 in 12 years. I think the first actual EW course was taught about two years ago, so it was revamped, and it became a super technical course. And now we're part of the cyber branch, because they brought us over a few years ago.

Ken (06:00):
It's really interesting to hear this, because it reiterates the fact that you mentioned in the beginning, it started in 2010, you were starting from scratch. And that's extraordinarily difficult to do, particularly in any military service, but when you think about the various levels of the Army leadership on down, you have to get everybody to buy in for these changes to catch hold and to continue to sustain and grow, and adapt into the future. So obviously they were facing a threat, IEDs, in the 2000s, and you relied a lot on the Air Force and the Navy and the expertise that's out there, but from an Army leadership perspective, how did they go about getting their heads around all this, to make sure organizationally across the entire service that changes needed to be made, were made properly?

Eric (06:48):
So that's a great question. And I have to give it all back to... Many folks on this show and the AOC know Colonel Laurie Buckhout. She actually started this fight a former signal officer. She had to get attention of senior leaders to say, "Here's the problem." So General Chiarelli charged her when she was in the Pentagon to figure this out. And that's usually the problem. They take a O-6 and say, "Figure this out," without very much guidance. And she did amazing. So for one officer in the Army alone and by herself to create an MOS, that's flourished to where it is now, is amazing, but it just took stick-to-itiveness. There was a problem, they assigned the right officer at the time to actually get after the problem. And by herself with her staff, I want to give credit to her staff that was fledgling, and they just brought them as they were. She got a direction of, "Go figure this out." She did.

Eric (07:37):
And 12 years later, we are an MOS, but it took her utilizing... Anytime we lose soldiers or injure soldiers, that's a big deal. If you look at Afghanistan, when we're closing Afghanistan down and we lost those marines and soldiers right before we pulled out, it takes an event like that to make something significant. We call that a significant emotional event that occurs. It took that to realize, we don't have the ability to protect our soldiers. EW is necessary. And even though we threw a lot of money at the problem, the way we see is that we lost a lot of soldiers initially. When we started bringing these counter-IED equipment downrange, we slowly, methodically lost less soldiers.

Eric (08:17):
But it took the... I got to give credit to Colonel Buckhout. She's actually my mentor to this day. It took her stick-to-itiveness to identify the problem, come up with a plan, and 12 years later, we have a MOS with a doctrine, we rewrote doctrine. There's a lot of electronic warfare professionals that work inside the Pentagon now, because it is a big problem. And mind you, electronic warfare was a problem before the new cyber thing that we'll talk about down the road was a problem, because cyber didn't exist now. To be correct, NetOps and other sister services, we've been doing cyber in some capacity for the last 30 years, but it wasn't until the cyber branch came in that people started realizing, "Wow, there's an electronic warfare branch?" And it's difficult. Ken, you're absolutely right. It wasn't easy. We did the best thing we could to figure out how to train men and equip these individual soldiers. But unfortunately, we still haven't really equipped them properly. Counter-IEDs was a thing. And I'll stop there, but that's where we're at today.

Ken (09:13):
Yeah. I want to pull the thread on the equipment piece, because if you look back through EW history, oftentimes we respond to crises that emerge in current conflict, and there's a gap or there's a threat or there's something that we can't defeat, and we make mistakes or we fail at something. And that's when we realize, oh wait, we need electronic warfare. And then we basically flood the battlefield with a solution, or something that might work, but it's not actually built to sustain, and it's not built to improve capability beyond that one particular fight. And so oftentimes there's quick reaction capability that's funding based on immediate need, it can solve a short term problem, but when you're trying to piece together a true robust electronic warfare capability and equip your force accordingly, you have to get out of that model of thinking.

Ken (10:06):
So how did the Army switch gears? Because obviously IEDs could still be a threat, but that's not the motivating force. And you look at the battlefield, it looks more complex and different than what started this Army push for EW. So how does the Army switch gears and say, "We're no longer responding to this threat and this reality, but we still understand now EW is critical, so here's how we got to approach the capability"?

Eric (10:33):
So Ken, that's a great question. And you're right, the way we handled the problem initially was through quick reaction capabilities, QRCs and operational need statements, et cetera. And they were designed to fix a problem immediately, but there was no program in place to identify, how do we sustain any of that stuff?

Eric (10:51):
So just a quick update. All the counter-IED devices that were sent to Iraq and Afghanistan were all brought together in a certain location, they brought it all back, and there was no plan to use the stuff that we spent thousands if not millions of dollars on. So again, no sustainment, no program, no plan of what to do with this equipment we bought. And if civilians figured out today that we spent all these millions of dollars and then stuff is sitting in a Conex van somewhere and not being used, then there would be a lot of folks that are upset. So there is plans to cannibalize that stuff and reuse it, and at the end of the day, it's all a software defined radio, and as technology changes, all that stuff would become obsolete anyway.

Eric (11:29):
But the first problem we had is, we made all this equipment, we pushed it downrange, and we started using it with no sustainment. And so pointedly, the only programs of record that exist in the Army today are a thing called Electronic Warfare Planning, a management tool that they've been working on that thing for about eight years now, and that's simply a analysis tool that allows electronic warfare professionals to see the invisible EMS that you were referring to a minute ago. But there's no real capabilities attached to it, so it's just like a computer that you have to pull in RF data that comes from the environment. But until you're using the equipment, it's not really... It doesn't work per se. You have to touch stuff.

Eric (12:11):
So for the last 12 years, we've utilized QRCs, as you said earlier, quick reaction capabilities, and a lot of operational needs statements to say, here's my problem. So all the systems that exist today, that we've actually loaned to Ukraine in the war with Russia, is not a program of record. It wasn't developed programmatically. And so it's just there somewhere, and then we use it, and then we lose it.

Eric (12:35):
The second system program of record is coming out as a Terrestrial Layer System or TLS. So finally this is the first time that soldiers are actually going to get equipment to do electronic warfare. We've trained them for the last several years on how to use the equipment, but we never provided equipment to them until now. So finally the first systems, a couple prototypes, were being developed. By the next fiscal year, these systems are going to be delivered to the soldiers, with sustainment, with programmatics, with the whole DOTMLPF perspective, there's training, there's leadership, there's everything. And then they're actually going to be putting that in the hands of soldiers, because as you know, there's something to learn theory, but until you start applying theory through practice, you forget a lot of the stuff that you were taught. So this is the first time we actually have programs of record to put in electronic warfare soldiers' hands to do their job. So the other problem is, is the equipment updated? Is it current? Or is it just old stuff we started making several years ago?

Ken (13:30):
Well, I was going to ask you about that. Because you're talking about EWPMT, and good capability in theory, but it has been eight years. If you're trying to build an iPhone to make it relevant in one year, at one particular year, by the time it comes out, it's almost like you're chasing obsolescence a little bit, because by the time you get it ready to go, it's already behind, and you can't put something out in the field that's obsolete, so it almost... It's a difficult task, I think, when you try to put something this together, to stay ahead of the curve and stay ahead of the threat, enough that it's actually a usable and effective system in the field. So what's going on with that program, success or challenges that you can share about how that is going to affect positively the Army's ability to conduct EW?

Eric (14:19):
So to your point, it all goes back to Moore's Law. Everybody knows what Moore's Law is, but no-one really can explain it. And that's just the idea that technology changes so much, so fast, that we're always chasing technology. So I think mathematically it's something like, a transistor size gets smaller seven times every year, whatever. And I think I would argue that Moore's Law is probably coming to an end, but quantum is a different issue altogether. But the fact that it takes so long to get stuff out forces us to understand that we need to stay ahead of technology.

Eric (14:51):
So there's a couple pathways that we've gotten after. So from TLS finally coming out, I can tell you that the hardware and the software inside of TLS will be timely and it'll be adaptable. So it's not doom and gloom that they're finally getting something after eight to ten years. The stuff that comes out, there's a new concept that [inaudible 00:15:10] in Aberdeen is focused on, it's called CMOSS. And so CMOSS is simply a chassis that allows you to buy hardware, and then the internal stuff can be updated consistently at a lower price point, because you're just putting cards into that. So the standard that the Army identified several years ago was a CMOSS standard that says, your equipment industry has to fit in this chassis, and it has to be able to give us the opportunity to update it as soon as we can, when technology is developed that improves it.

Eric (15:39):
So software defined radios are relatively not a new thing, but the way they work, there's always going to be new cards that you could put into whatever. So the Army came up with the CMOSS standard through SOSA, and it's just a industry standard that says, if you guys are developing stuff, it has to fit into this chassis. And the chassis I refer to is what's inside the TLS, what's inside tactical radios, it all has to make everything work together and be adaptable and updated and upgraded quickly. So that's a standard that the Army went to, that I believe at this point is going to be a way to stay ahead of technology's changes. It's going to make that faster process whenever you have to reprogram anything. So that's a good thing the military has done, the Army specifically. I know the marines have requirements to develop CMOSS technologies too.

Eric (16:24):
So that was good. We realized, we can't buy a radio ten years ago and then still use it today. And so that's very promising, and I think in the National Defense Authorization Act in the letter that AOC sent to Congress, that was one of the priorities, was spending $45 million or something like that on CMOSS capabilities. And I just wanted take a minute to explain what that is. So that's good. So your initial question, when we finally do get TLS, BCT, and EWPMT it's going to have to be adaptable. And if it's not now, then we're going to actually suffer to the same stuff that happened before.

Eric (16:54):
So I'm happy to say CMOSS is [inaudible 00:16:57] but some industry leaders will say, there's no way we can make one thing adaptable and everything can fit into this box. But unfortunately that's how it's going to have to be, because limited funding every year. EW always loses funds when we come to war fighting, because no one can see the benefits of electronic warfare systems and tools, but I could see a bomb blow up and I could... So much money has gone to Ukraine, again I refer back to Ukraine, to give them lethal weapons as opposed to non-lethal capabilities. And so that's where we're at today.

Ken (17:30):
So I wanted to go back to, you were talking about the funding of these programs and where these programs are at. AOC, we sent a letter to Congress prior to the National Defense Authorization Act coming to the floor, highlighting the list of EW relevant programs on the unfunded priorities list from each of the services. And some of the programs that did catch our attention were CMOSS and Terrestrial Layer System, echelon above brigade. It was unfunded at 35 million, you had CMOSS unfunded at 45 million, you had Distributed Common Ground System unfunded at 28 million. You hear the Army talk about the importance of a lot of these programs, and then you see them appear on an unfunded list. And of course, what we hope now is, with the increase in funding that just took place the via NDAA last week, that some of these programs will be funded. But what message is that sending when, on one hand, we have the Army saying these programs are important, but then they appear on the unfunded list, and what can we take away from that?

Eric (18:39):
So my time that I spent at the Pentagon [inaudible 00:18:42] opened my eyes to that. If your requirements exist, you have to bring them to the attention of senior leadership to say, we need this stuff. But at the end of the day, when it comes to you can't write a check for everything, certain things are sacrificed. MFEW Air Large went away for a while, it got unfunded, but MFEW Air Large is another capability that gave soldiers the ability to have their own internal ES support overhead so that they could do operations. So when something is not lethal, it gets unfunded, because it is a requirement, but if we can't afford to pay for it, we're not going to get it. And that's what happens with a lot of this unfunded stuff is yes, there's a big need, it's important, but at the end of the day, we need tanks, we need aircraft, we need lethal munitions, and that's all we can afford to do. So someone in the G7 has to make those hard decisions. What can we afford?

Ken (19:34):
What can we do differently as a community, then? Because we're always going to be competing for limited resources. And when I opened the interview, we talked about EMSO is backbone for everything we do, and yet we're still falling second fiddle or down the list in terms of priority for funding major programs. So what can we as a community be doing differently for senior leadership, not just in the Army, but this happens in all the services, and when it comes time to say, we have $1, we need to make sure that we give it to EW first, because if we don't give it to the backbone for mission success, then what we'd want to do over here isn't going to work. So how do we as a community push that?

Eric (20:17):
It's going to take a cultural shift, because we are used to blowing things up, shooting lethal things downrange. It's funny, from the [inaudible 00:20:25] it's not funny, but ironically, it's okay for a O-6 colonel to authorize a dropping of a MOAB than it is for him to authorize any cyber stuff. And I say that because we have to change culturally to understand what non-lethal EMS superiority means. And so Ukraine, again I'll go back to that, it's good realization that the Russia-Ukraine war happened, because now we can see outside of a counter-IED fight what is necessary to beat a competitor that's ten times as large as you are. I would argue that EW is one way that's empowered Ukraine to fight Russia, and the misunderstanding of EW is what's caused Russia to suffer a lot. Like them, they didn't have trained, manned, and equipped folks. And they had equipment in this case, but they didn't have training.

Eric (21:16):
So it's going to take, again, a significant emotional event for our senior leaders to understand that this is important. Until we have that change in mindset about the EMS being important, we'll continue to lose capability and capacity, because we can't take that dollar you mentioned and cut it in half, or make $10 out of the $1 bill. But what happens with these current events is, we realize both in Taiwan and what China wants to do and that stuff, it's important to dominate in the EMS, because you've heard of multi-domain operations. We understand that the next war is going to be joint. We're probably never going to fight force on force, like the old days. We're going to have to invest in technologies, because this next war is going to be a very technological war, and it's going to take senior leaders to understand what that means.

Eric (22:02):
And for us, including the AOC, it's imperative that we show, the next congested war, it's important that we understand how to maneuver in that battle space. And the electromagnetic spectrum is the battle space that everybody uses. So until that is done, until that's recognized by our senior leadership, we're going to continue to lose the fight for I need a dollar, and I need bullets, and I need tanks, and I need helicopters. But I think that it's changing with the adoption and acceptance of the cyber battle space. We understand how the ones and zeros and the electrons really could change the battlefield. And I think that the creation of the cyber MOS and the cyber branch is teaching senior leaders that it's not about artillery and infantry and all that stuff, it's what can we use as smart weapons exist to get after the problem set. But it's really going to take a cultural change with senior leaders.

Ken (22:52):
We talk a lot about joint operations, and I've been in some meetings where we... With regarding the budget, the defense budget, and some of the steps that some of the services were taking. One of the issues was of course the Navy budget plan to invest in the expeditionary squadron Growlers. And you also have the divestment plans for A-10s or the Compass Call. And all those assets, which are... The A-10 is not an EW system, but what's interesting is it conducts really a largely Army mission, and yet it's the Air Force saying, "Here's what we want to do with that aircraft". And so you there's this joint mission, there's this joint operation, and this decision made by a service that goes against this concept of jointness.

Ken (23:39):
And some of those funding decisions, it's frustrating when you're trying to push the joint concept of war fighting and EMSO and multi-domain operations and all that, and then you have services empowered to man, train, and equip, and they're making service specific recommendations. What else can we do to make sure that senior leadership is there in OSD, across DOD, to say, "Wait a second, you're making this decision in a service, but there's a joint implication to this decision that we have to pay attention to," so it doesn't get to the point where you're leaving it up to Congress to say, "Wait a second, why are you doing this?" Or put money back into it. Because then it becomes this ongoing process where, well, we can cut this program because we know Congress is going to put money into it. And we've experienced that in the past. So we want to get away from that. So how do we get in front and get our senior leadership to step in and say, "These service decisions can or cannot happen or must change because of the joint implications"?

Eric (24:39):
I think that starts with understanding how we fight. There's different operations or layers of warfare. We talked about this before, but there's a strategic layer, operational layer, and the tactical layer of warfare. And the Army lives a lot in the tactical battle space, because what they do is direct force on force in the physical country and the location of where the fight is. Navy and Air Force, they're more standoff, distanced, they're more strategic. And so a lot of the capabilities that exist are to do a strategic mission. And that's why they don't think about the A-10s going away and the EC-130s, because those are capabilities designed that may do tactical operations, but they're doing it for a strategic purpose. The Army has never thought that way, because the Army, and the Marines too, bless them, they're at the location where the threat is. And so they're forced to actually worry about what's going on in that physical area.

Eric (25:35):
Cyber is something that we've actually started realizing has strategic consequences and effects all the way down to tactical effects. And the Army's the only force currently that's realized that cyber could also have a tactical application. So they've actually created several expeditionary SEMA teams that are going to provide commanders that close access that is needed, because it's location. Not virtual location, but physical location.

Eric (26:03):
And so as we start understanding that all the forces have to work together in the multi-domain world and the joint world, there's stuff that we're going to lose that the Army depends on, because they don't have their own equipment. Take, for example, the Growler that you mentioned. It is a Navy asset. It is a strategic asset, but has tactical applications, but it's not until the Army says, "I need some of that, because I don't have my own capability," that we can't get rid of those pieces of equipment that exist. And it's because simply the services don't necessarily understand what they can do for each other. And so when we start working jointly, which we're going to in the EMS especially, there's things that are going to come and go that the Navy didn't realize, these guys really use this thing too, even though it's a Navy program, the Army guys need it because the Army's limited to some of the resources they have.

Eric (26:51):
And it all comes back down to limited resources. Congress, unfortunately it's their call to make, to bridge to divide, because the Air Force is going to worry about Air Force programs, Navy's going to always focus on Navy programs, the Army's going to look to other folks to help them, because there's a lot of stuff that they don't have the ability to do, but they're the ones on the ground that need to do operations. So again, similar to the cultural shift, we maybe have to develop a panel that says, "Let's identify these joint needs before we get rid of them, because these guys don't have the ability."

Eric (27:21):
And I think that may fix itself, because there's not going to be any more specific branch fights a fight anymore. It's always going to be joint now. And we're also going to have partners. So the other thing we have to recognize is, what do our partners have that can help us in the event that we don't have the resources? And I mean that, from an example, with some cyber stuff, Australia and the UK, they have some capabilities that we don't have the authority or the ability to use. So we're not only going to have to understand how to fight jointly and what our sister services have, but also what our nation state partners have too. Because if you think from that perspective, we'll be able to fight jointly, and we're not just going to fight jointly, we're going to fight with our partners as well. So understanding what everybody brings to the table, would change the way we get rid of stuff without knowing or being aware of, I needed that and it's going away, like the Growlers and the Prowlers.

Ken (28:12):
I wanted to go back to the topic, and you mentioned it throughout several of your answers, what's going on with Russia and Ukraine? And from a tactical standpoint, I think there's a lot that we can learn or we are learning from an Army perspective of what the future fight might entail from a ground perspective. So can you talk a little bit about what you're seeing going on over there? What are some of the lessons the Army is learning or need to learn with the developments taking place over there?

Eric (28:36):
So the biggest lesson that the military needs to learn is how things work before we actually go downrange and have to use them. There are a lot of limitations with turning on systems in the United States and CONUS. So whether you have a capability, you may not be able to use that until you go overseas, because you don't have the authority to use that here. We're working currently on an electronic warfare study that says, what do we need to make ranges look like? So if you imagine, if we make a multi-domain range to test lethal effects, we also have to test cyber, EW, and spectrum effects. And so our limitation in CONUS is, a lot of the equipment we're developing that's being used in Ukraine, we can't test, we can't turn on.

Eric (29:19):
So the problem you have is, you can have trained soldiers, you could have equipment, but until you know how it really works, all bets are off on understanding the applications. And so what we found in Ukraine is, when I was in the schoolhouse, we learned that Russia and China have very robust electronic warfare equipment. Super robust. And China's got brigades of electronic warfare personnel. China doesn't have the limitations on testing their stuff out, and Russia doesn't have limitations on testing their stuff out. So in theory, you would think that they're manned and they're trained and they're equipped.

Eric (29:56):
Problem is, with Russia and the Ukraine, two things. The soldiers were poorly trained on the equipment to do electronic warfare and spectrum management operations in the fight, number one. And number two, if you're fighting on top of each other, jamming affects everyone, not only your enemy, but yourself. And so what happened initially is, when they started using jammers, Russia realized that they couldn't communicate themselves. So they were forced to shut that stuff off so that they could talk. They even relegated, because of the communications problems, they started using cell phones to communicate and stuff like that. So because they didn't have trained people with the knowledge of how to use these systems, they became a product of their own environment, so that they basically jammed themselves and they couldn't communicate.

Eric (30:44):
So that's why you see why primarily Ukraine has been able to fight against Russia by themselves, because of this misuse of technology. And then it goes back to the leadership. Many Russian soldiers and senior leaders have been killed in the war, but nobody had really trained with some of this equipment. So although China and Russia both had a lot of capability and capacity to do electronic warfare, they hadn't really trained. I speak only for Russia in this instance, because they hadn't used the systems in so many years that they didn't know the effects that would happen on the battlefield, which is a key learning lesson for us, because now I think we must start using equipment. Not only do we need to make equipment for Army to do EW, but to have to really use it in a live environment, because you can train in simulations and you can use stuff how it's going to work in theory, but until you turn the systems on, you really don't know how they're going to work. And so that was a big thing.

Eric (31:37):
And then there's some news stories recently said that the U.S. government was sending equipment to Ukraine for them to do EW. Well, I would ask you, Ken, what equipment? Because our soldiers don't have equipment yet, so I'd be interested in knowing what stuff was sent. And now that's classified of what they sent. I think that if the UK provides them stuff, UK's got capability, Australia's got capability, but I would've liked to know what specifically electronic warfare equipment they sent Ukraine, because my guys would need that here in the U.S. too, so that they have equipment to do stuff.

Eric (32:08):
Of course it's journalists, it's news stories, so we don't know specifically what was said, but you have to operate this equipment to see how it really works before you get in theater, because when you use it there for the first time, you never know what kind of congested environment you're operating in. And you're probably going to do what everybody does, Ken, and that's turn your system off because you don't know what it's doing to the rest of the stuff. And that's not good for electronic warfare protection or security for forces in general.

Ken (32:32):
And we learned those lessons over in Iraq when we first introduced the IED jammers. I want to talk a little bit about the training piece, because we talked earlier in the episode about how a lot of the technology, a lot of the capability is still on its way, but the Army has taken a lot of great steps to set up, to organize this class of electronic warfare expertise in the Army. Could you talk a little bit about how the Army is accomplishing training in realistic threat environments, when the capability that they need to use in the next battle is still on the horizon?

Eric (33:08):
So you have the ability through technology to do virtual training in some instances, and modeling and simulations. So that's how we can see how things are supposed to work in theory. That exists, and we have pipelines there. In addition, we're working on efforts to give all the CTCs, the training centers, the ability to train in the EMS battle space, in the cyber battle space. So you can train people by using things through virtual solutions and simulations. You still can't do physical. So that's a way to understand how things work, and you can actually turn on a system and do what's called a closed loop test to see what it does. So as the operator, you can see what it's supposed to do without really turning it on. So it's not all doom and gloom without actually having the stuff turned on really in real life, but it limits the understanding capacity.

Eric (33:58):
So we do have ways to train. As I said before, EW MOS has existed since 2010, and we've pushed out probably 1,500 to 2,000 soldiers that are electronic warfare professionals. And they do this every day. They fall in on equipment and they figure out how it works. Additionally, the U.S. Army and the U.S. military empowers every one of their soldiers to make decisions, from a brand new E-1, all the way up to a senior leader. And so Russia, they don't empower their soldiers to make decisions. We do. And so that's a big thing, is that when we train folks with the Western mindset, we teach them that you have to be prepared to make decisions, or you have to figure it out. And they're not limited by their own abilities or knowledge or attributes. They figure it out as they go.

Eric (34:43):
And that's the best thing I could say about electronic work for professionals, is we've developed them with the MOS. Some say that the MOS training initially wasn't robust enough to make them learn things, but most of the soldiers, if not all the soldiers, have the wherewithal to learn more themselves in their actual job with limited equipment. So there's ways to learn how to do things when you're not limited by what you're given. And I think I want to say, from the soldiers that I've had and managed for the last 15 years, they've been high quality soldiers coming in with degrees and all that stuff already. So we're fortunate enough to have folks like that in our services that figure it out. And I know that's not a really great answer, that figure it out when you get there, but that's how we've actually operated for many, many years.

Eric (35:30):
And the Army teaches you that. They teach you a fundamental skill, and then they push you out to your units, and then the rest of the soldiers and the senior leaders will train you what they think that you need to know. So we don't forget about our folks once they graduate from their MOS producing schools.

Ken (35:44):
Well, thank you for taking time to join me. That's all the time we have for today's episode, but it was a good conversation, and I'd like to have you back on a regular basis, just talk. There's so much more we could talk about, but I do want to thank you for taking the time today to join me.

Eric (36:00):
It's been my pleasure, and looking forward to the next AOC conference, the annual that's coming up in October, I believe.

Ken (36:05):
October 25th to 27th.

Eric (36:08):
So I urge everybody listening to this podcast today to make sure you're there. I'll be happy to do this again with you. It's my pleasure, Ken, to help you guys out, and I appreciate what you guys are doing. Thank you so much.

Ken (36:19):
That will conclude this episode of From the Crows' Nest. I'd like to thank my guest, Eric Colon, for joining me this afternoon to discuss this important topic. As always, we ask that you take a few minutes to rate and subscribe us wherever you download your podcasts, or you can learn more and leave a comment or email crows.org/podcast. We enjoy hearing from our listeners and look forward to hearing ways that we can continue to improve the show. Thank you for listening.